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THE CHANGING ODDS OF THE
CHANCERY LOTTERY
Marianna Wonder*
Delaware is home to the majority of shareholder class action litigations
related to mergers and acquisitions (M&A). These cases usually result in
settlements that provide shareholders with only disclosure in exchange for
a broad release of future claims, which encompasses unknown and federal
security claims. The Delaware Court of Chancery must review and
approve these settlements under Delaware Rule 23(e), which has been
interpreted as creating a fiduciary duty for the court to protect the interests
of absent shareholders. Nevertheless, Delaware has a history of routinely
approving disclosure-only settlements with laxity. Recently, members of the
court have begun discussing the issues with this process and, in some cases,
have begun rejecting settlements that were previously likely to be approved.
This active discussion, combined with the discretion given to the individual
members of the court to make their own business judgment, has resulted in
each developing their own method of reviewing disclosure-only settlements
and applying their fiduciary duty.
After developing a backdrop of the prototypical M&A case and the rules
that define the court’s role, this Note reviews recent decisions of each
member of the court in order to understand their individual method of
reviewing settlements and how they apply their duty to shareholders in this
process. This Note then identifies the interest group theory as a potential
explanation for the external factors that may influence the court’s diverging
methodologies. This Note concludes that in order to create a more
consistent standard that fully applies the court’s fiduciary duty to
shareholders, the Court of Chancery should (1) adopt a new materiality
standard based on the merits of the case at filing, and (2) limit approval to
settlements that have releases that are proportional to the relief provided to
shareholders.
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INTRODUCTION
A recent study has revealed that 94.9 percent of merger and acquisition
(M&A) transactions over $100 million are challenged in shareholder
litigation.1 The similarity between so many of these cases makes this
statistic troubling, particularly because it indicates that M&A litigation has
become routine, regardless of actual merit. Historically, a large majority of
M&A lawsuits have been class actions filed in Delaware.2 The cases often
result in settlement, with the only relief to shareholders being supplemental
disclosures in exchange for a broad release of their future claims.3 This
1. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2014, at 1–2
(Feb. 20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2567902 (indicating that
94.9 percent of deals in 2014 over $100 million were challenged through litigation, each
triggering an average of four lawsuits) [perma.cc/MDT6-3H98].
2. Due to the large number of corporations that take advantage of Delaware’s
incorporation benefits, Delaware is the most popular destination for M&A lawsuits. Jonathan
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate
Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 484 (1987).
3. Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An
Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 559 (2015).
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broad release prevents future litigation against the defendant company
related to the same merger.4 Although judicial approval of class action
settlements is statutorily imposed and is meant to safeguard absent
shareholders’ interests during the settlement process, it does not always
achieve this purpose.5 Delaware has a history of routinely approving M&A
settlements while using a low level of scrutiny in review that does not
always line up with the court’s “gatekeeper” duty.6 The standard of
materiality for reviewing supplemental disclosures gradually became so
relaxed that even information that was considered of only minor benefit was
being approved, and releases began reaching global breadths.7 By mid2015, the Delaware Court of Chancery began to reassess this practice.8
Members of the court began making their concerns about the previous
review process known, and media reports began spinning the court’s
recognition into a story that showed the end of routine approvals.9
The Delaware Court of Chancery is a unique institution with an
important role in corporate law.10 This “specialized trial court,” which “sits
without a jury,” is comprised of judges who are appointed through a

4. 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
& BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 13.31, at 13-148 n.683 (3d ed. 2015).
5. See 4 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 13:40 (5th ed. 2015)
(describing the difficulties that courts face in reviewing class action settlements, despite
having a fiduciary duty to absent class members during settlement to protect those class
members’ rights).
6. See Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 381, 389–402
(2011) (referring to the fiduciary-like role of the judge in settlement approval as being a
“gatekeeper”).
7. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 51–52, In re Carefusion Corp.
Stockholders Litig., No. 10214-VCN (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript of
Settlement Hearing, Carefusion] (describing the “helpful and perhaps clarifying” disclosures
as a basis for approving the settlements); Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 42, Assad v.
World Energy Sols., Inc., No. 10324-CB (Del. Ch. Aug. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript of
Settlement Hearing, Assad] (approving a settlement with a global release based on it being
consistent with how the court handled similar consideration in the past).
8. See infra Part III.A–C.
9. See, e.g., Delaware Court of Chancery Signals Stricter Approach to Approving
Settlements in M&A Deals, PRAC. L. CORP. & SEC. (Jul. 22, 2015), http://us.practicallaw.
com/w-000-4790?source=relatedcontent [perma.cc/4UQ4-2CMA]; Daniel Fisher, Delaware
Judge Tells Plaintiff Lawyers: The M&A ‘Deal Tax’ Game Is Over, FORBES (Sept. 18,
2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/09/18/delaware-judge-tells-plaintifflawyers-the-ma-deal-tax-game-is-over [perma.cc/HB3Y-CMH5]; William Foley Jr. et al.,
The Rise & Rise of M&A Litigation, LAWFUEL (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.lawfuel.com/
the-rise-rise-of-ma-litigation [perma.cc/GSL6-NQMS]; Kevin LaCroix, The Beginning of the
End of the Merger Objection Lawsuit Curse?, D&O DIARY (July 16, 2015), http://www.
dandodiary.com/2015/07/articles/shareholders-derivative-litigation/the-beginning-of-theend-of-the-merger-objection-lawsuit-curse [perma.cc/B8M5-YPFT].
10. The Delaware Court of Chancery is the self proclaimed “preeminent forum for the
determination of disputes involving the internal affairs of . . . thousands of Delaware
corporations . . . through which a vast amount of the world’s commercial affairs is
conducted[, with a] unique competence in and exposure to issues of business law [that] are
unmatched.” Welcome to the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware, DEL. ST. CTS.,
http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [perma.cc/8GE8-PF4J].
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nonpolitical process.11 The court is known for its “sufficiently uncrowded
docket” that permits expeditious resolution of urgent cases.12 The common
law focus of the development of Delaware law gives the Court of Chancery
the unique power to play a central role in developing Delaware’s corporate
law.13 This style also increases the likelihood that decisions will be made
based on “the prevailing judicial attitude” of each individual member of the
court, creating uncertainty as to the court’s decision at the time of filing and
depending largely on who is assigned the case.14 Each chancellor has their
own concerns and their own way of applying these concerns when
reviewing cases and making their ultimate decisions.15 These divergent
methodologies have resulted in shifting odds for those seeking settlement
approval, based solely on who is assigned to the docket.16 While some
judges use a high level of scrutiny to assess settlements, thereby ensuring
the protection of absent shareholders and preventing unfair settlements,
others continue to approve settlements that they recognize as being of little
value to shareholders.
This Note analyzes the Delaware Court of Chancery’s practices for
reviewing disclosure-only settlements in light of the court’s duties and other
factors that may influence their decision making. This Note proposes that
the court establish a firmer standard with consistent application by all
members of the court in order to minimize frivolous M&A lawsuits. Part I
discusses the standard practices of M&A litigation and the court’s role in
this process. Part II reviews a number of recent Delaware Court of
Chancery decisions, identifying the different methods used by each
chancellor in approving or rejecting settlements and how this complies with
that chancellor’s statutory duty as a fiduciary to the class. Part III identifies
a theory that explains the external factors that impact chancellor
methodologies and how this results in divergent decisions from different
members of the court. Based on this analysis, Part IV argues that a new
materiality standard should be adopted where settlement consideration is
only deemed material when the claims were meritorious at filing.
Furthermore, Part IV argues that the court should only approve releases that
are proportional to the relief granted.
I. THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
There is a prototypical process of filing and pursuing M&A litigation in
Delaware that is controlled by the Delaware Court of Chancery. The rules
that allow for this litigation also require that the court review the
11. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1760 (2006) (describing the unique features of the Delaware Court of
Chancery).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1761.
14. Id. Hamermesh describes the court as “embrac[ing] a traditional, reactive model of
judge-centered lawmaking.” Id. at 1771 (quoting Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic
Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1618 (2005)).
15. See infra Part II.A–D.
16. See infra Part II.
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settlements that it typically produces. This part describes this process and
the law that guides it. Part I.A discusses the underpinnings of disclosureonly settlements. Part I.A also describes the legal basis for these
settlements and what a typical settlement looks like from agreement to
approval. Part I.B explains Delaware Rule 23(e), which establishes judicial
review, and how and why it has been interpreted to establish an additional
duty to protect shareholder interests.
A. The Classic Game of M&A Shareholder Litigation
When an M&A transaction is announced, there are two remedies for
shareholders who are displeased with the transaction: appraisal suits and
shareholder class actions.17 When shareholders sue for appraisal, they are
suing to have the value of their shares appraised by the court, with hope that
the shares are valued higher than the transaction price, in order to receive a
damage award for the difference.18 Appraisal actions are usually only
worthwhile for institutional investors and other shareholders who have large
enough blocks of shares that the litigation costs are lower than the potential
damages.19 For all other shareholders, however, there is the option of
collective action.20 While shareholder class actions cannot be brought for
financial damages, they can be brought for injunctive relief.21 Generally,
these suits are brought on claims that the company’s board of directors has
breached its fiduciary duty by pursuing or agreeing to the merger22 and are
filed seeking a temporary or permanent injunction to stop the deal from
being completed.23 The court allows this type of M&A litigation in order to
ensure that shareholders get the most out of their final opportunity to
receive the “best value reasonably available” for their shares.24 By

17. 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 9.37; see also Charles R. Korsmo &
Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75
OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 832 (2014) (considering appraisal a “parallel remedy” to shareholder class
actions).
18. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 17, at 859; Mary Siegel, Back to the Future:
Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 91 (1995)
(explaining that shareholders receive the fair value of their stock as damages in an appraisal
action).
19. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 17, at 838 (explaining that an individual
shareholder’s holding is often too small to make the potential recovery worth enough to
justify the costs of pursuing an action individually); Alix Partners, M&A Litigation: The
Upswing in Appraisal Rights Actions, INSIGHT: FIN. ADVISORY SERVS., May 2014, at 1,
http://www.alixpartners.com/en/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uGkRP24IJ2A%3d&tabid=635
(describing the types of shareholders who bring appraisal actions as “institutional investors
such as hedge funds and other large investors”) [perma.cc/G7Q3-HZ9E].
20. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 17, at 832–33 (describing the two types of
shareholder actions in M&A as fiduciary class actions and appraisal actions).
21. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 565.
22. See id. at 563–64.
23. Id. at 565.
24. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 50 (Del. 1994).
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providing shareholders with the opportunity to stop the transaction, the
court’s interests cannot be overlooked.25
It is common knowledge that courts favor settlement as a matter of public
policy.26 This is no different in M&A litigation. Initially, the court began
approving settlements that include minimal consideration for shareholders
in M&A class actions in order to allow defendants an alternative to costly
litigation.27 This choice, however, resulted in a proliferation of M&A
litigation.28 This proliferation has resulted in M&A shareholder litigation
being commonly considered a side effect of M&A activity,29 or a “deal
tax.”30
There is a standardized process that many M&A lawsuits follow, from
filing to settlement.31 There is a subset of plaintiffs’ attorneys who solicit
clients through press releases and other advertising or through “standing
arrangements with shareholder clients.”32 Their chosen shareholder must
be representative of the class, which normally is made up of all current
shareholders at the time of filing.33 Once the attorney finds a shareholder
who is willing to become the representative, she files a complaint that
alleges that the directors have breached their fiduciary duty to shareholders
by supporting the transaction.34 Initial complaints commonly contain little
detail about the case at hand, as they are commonly filed within only a few
days of the companies announcing the transaction, before any proxy
25. See id. at 42 (describing the court’s role as protecting shareholders from unwarranted
inference with their rights).
26. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 10020-CB, 2016 WL 325008, at *4
(Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016) (“Delaware has long favored the voluntary settlement of
litigation . . . .”).
27. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 63–64, Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding Corp.,
No. 7930-VCL (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript of Settlement Hearing,
Aeroflex] (describing the previous rationale for approving settlements as out of sympathy for
defendants); Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12563, 1995 WL 250374, at *4 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 21, 1995) (explaining that “economical rational defendants” are willing to settle
claims “for a peppercorn and a fee” because it is difficult to survive a motion to dismiss),
aff’d, 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
28. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 64.
29. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 559–60.
30. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 9 (describing the tactic of combining “deal tax” and
“deal insurance” as occurring when lawyers tax companies with their fees in exchange for
selling them deal insurance “in the form of a global release of future claims that might
otherwise hinder their deal”); see also Trulia, 2016 WL 325008, at *6 (describing the release
in a settlement as “deal insurance”).
31. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 559 (describing the M&A litigation process that
results in disclosure-only settlement).
32. Korsmo & Myers, supra note 17, at 857.
33. It is common for complaints to define the class as “shareholder[s] of [the company]
during all relevant times hereto.” See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Aich v. McCarthy, No. 11133VCN, 2015 WL 3936348 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2015) [hereinafter Complaint, Aich]; Complaint
at 3, Scott v. Humana, Inc., No. 11323-VCL (Del. Ch. July 22, 2015); Complaint at 3, In re
HCC Insurance Holdings Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 11159-CB, 2015 WL 4576497 (Del.
Ch. July 24, 2015).
34. Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 563–64; see also Trulia, 2016 WL 325008, at *5
(describing the “flurry of class action lawsuits [that are filed] alleging that the [company]
directors [have] breached their fiduciary duties by agreeing to sell the corporation for an
unfair price”).
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statement is filed with the Security and Exchange Commission35 (SEC).
The complaints are often amended once the proxy statement is released to
include a broader list of claims, but these claims often only focus on
disclosure issues.36 The disclosure claims usually allege that there is
misleading or omitted information in the proxy statement that is material to
shareholders in making the decision of whether to vote for the transaction.37
There is a short time frame between filing and settlement in the
prototypical merger class action.38 To speed up the litigation process, the
parties usually expedite discovery.39 Sometimes this is done through filing
a motion asking the court to grant an expedited process, but other times the
parties agree to expedite amongst themselves.40 Although the next step is
to have a hearing for a temporary injunction against the merger, settlement
commonly occurs before this happens.41
The result of this process is commonly a settlement with therapeutic
relief for the plaintiff class.42 Therapeutic relief in this kind of settlement
takes two forms: revisions to the terms of the merger agreement and
additional disclosures.43 It is most common today that settlements include
only additional disclosure in the proxy statement, establishing the term
“‘disclosure-only’ settlements.”44 As consideration for these settlements,
35. Ann Woolner et al., Merger Suits Often Mean Cash for Lawyers, Zero for Investors,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-02-16/lawyerscash-in-while-investor-clients-get-nothing-in-merger-lawsuit-deals (noting that the median
interval period for when complaints are filed after announcement is eight days, but in some
cases attorneys file complaints the next day) [perma.cc/STN6-N9RU]. A proxy statement is
a public disclosure that is required by the SEC in Rule 14a-3(a) under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and is published prior to the shareholder vote. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3
(2012). The proxy statement describes the transaction and contains all facts that are likely to
influence shareholders when they vote upon the merger proposal. Ferdinand S. Tinio,
Annotation, Sufficiency, Under § 14 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78n)
and Implementing Regulations, of Proxy or Information Statement Incident to Merger of
Corporation, 4 A.L.R. Fed. 1021 (2015).
36. See, e.g., Complaint, Aich, supra note 33.
37. See, e.g., Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 2000) (alleging a
number of claims that relate to omitted information in the proxy statement); Complaint,
Aich, supra note 33, at 2 (making claims of omission in the registration statement);
Complaint at 2, Phillips v. Amylin Pharm., Inc., No. 7673-CS, 2012 WL 2936805 (Del. Ch.
July 12, 2012) (making claims of omission in the registration statement).
38. See In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1067 (Del. Ch.
2015) (describing “routine disclosure-only settlements, [that are] entered into quickly after
ritualized quasi-litigation”).
39. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 565.
40. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Assad, supra note 7, at 38 (comparing the
process of self-expedition to the process of filing for a motion to expedite).
41. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 17, at 832 (indicating that some plaintiffs’
attorneys seek quick settlement that provides generous attorney’s fees instead of
aggressively litigating meritorious actions).
42. See K. Tyler O’Connell et al., Reducing the “Deal Tax”: Delaware’s Recent
Scrutiny of Nonmonetary Settlements, BUS. L. TODAY (Oct. 2015), http://www.americanbar.
org/publications/blt/2015/10/01_oconnell.html (describing the common types of relief
offered in M&A class action settlements as therapeutic in nature) [perma.cc/E8SC-A8MX].
43. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 566.
44. Id. at 566–67; see also Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 653084/13, 2014
WL 7250212, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014), aff’d, 2015 WL 4610912 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
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the plaintiffs are asked to sign a release of future litigation claims against
the defendants,45 with the purpose of preventing the defendants from having
to relitigate the same issues that they are settling again in another case.46
Despite this purpose, the extent of the release is rarely limited to the
information that was disclosed in the settlement, but instead covers a wide
breadth of potential claims.47 The release usually covers all potential
shareholder claims related to the M&A transaction, including those that are
unknown at the time of settlement and federal securities claims.48 The
release takes an all-encompassing form that has been labeled “intergalactic”
by Chief Justice Leo Strine.49
When two parties come to a settlement agreement, they file two
documents with the court: a memorandum of understanding, which
explains the basic terms of the settlement, and a joint stipulation of
settlement, which submits the final terms for approval.50 A settlement
hearing also is scheduled.51 At this hearing, the court reviews the
settlement agreement and determines whether it should be approved or
rejected.52 The court uses its own business judgment to assess whether the
settlement consideration is fair, adequate, and reasonable.53 The court
looks to the “give” and the “get,”54 and the parties must attempt to persuade
July 31, 2015) (describing a disclosure-only settlement as a “settlement relating to a
negotiated acquisition involving remedial disclosure”).
45. See Gordon, 2014 WL 7250212, at *2, *8 (describing settlements that result in
global releases in exchange for supplemental disclosures); Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 562
(describing releases as the goal of generating supplemental disclosures).
46. Nottingham Partners v. Dana, 564 A.2d 1089, 1106 (Del. 1989) (stating that a
release is meant to “achieve a comprehensive settlement” and to “prevent relitigation of
settled questions [that are] at the core of a class action” (quoting TBK Partners, Ltd. v. W.
Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982))).
47. O’Connell et al., supra note 42 (describing the release that defendants receive as
global, which means it covers “all possible claims, known or unknown, whether or not
suspected or matured, arising under any law (state or federal)” which relate to the facts and
issues leading up to the merger, the merger itself, or any allegations in the complaint).
48. See id.; Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Assad, supra note 7, at 41 (stating that
unknown and securities claims have been routinely included in the release in approved
settlements).
49. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 15 (referring to Chief
Justice Strine’s use of the term “intergalactic” to describe a global release).
50. 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 13.31 (describing the memorandum of
understanding as a document providing the basic terms of the settlement and the stipulation
of settlement as including the essential terms of the agreement, such as the scope of the
release and the amount of settlement consideration).
51. See Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 568 (describing the settlement hearing as where the
court approves the certification of the class, assesses if the settlement is fair and reasonable,
and determines the amount of fees for the plaintiffs’ counsel).
52. See id. at 568–72; see also infra Part I.B.
53. In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1063 n.26 (Del.
Ch. 2015) (listing a collection of cases that describe the standard); 1 BALOTTI &
FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 13.31 (stating that the court only investigates whether the
settlement should be approved as fair based on the existing circumstances); Sale, supra note
6, at 391 (“[J]udges must determine that the proposal is ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’”
(quoting FED R. CIV. P. 23(e))).
54. Activision Blizzard, 124 A.3d at 1043; Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 32,
Haverhill Retirement Sys. v. Asali, No. 9474-VCL (Del. Ch. June 8, 2015) [hereinafter
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the court that the supplemental disclosures are material.55 The court has
previously considered disclosures material when “there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote, [or] if, from the perspective of a reasonable
stockholder, there is a substantial likelihood that it ‘significantly alter[s] the
‘total mix’ of information made available.’”56 The court also can utilize a
more general review of materiality. In Chrysler Corp. v. Dann,57 the
Delaware Supreme Court held that claims are required to have merit at the
time the suit is filed.58 The court declared that “[a] claim is meritorious
within the meaning of the rule if it can withstand a motion to dismiss on the
pleadings if, at the same time, the plaintiff possesses knowledge of provable
facts which hold out some reasonable likelihood of ultimate success.”59
While this merit requirement still remains active precedent, it is at times
only limited to derivative suits60 and is only sometimes applied in M&A
class action settlement rulings.61
Although chancellors do not have the power to edit or redraft settlement
agreements, they do have the power to reject them.62 In rejecting
settlement agreements, chancellors can explain why they chose to do so and
thereby establish a template for what they would have approved or what the
court would likely view favorably in the future.63 The chancellors are also
able to require parties to provide the court with more information before
making a decision64 and can scrutinize fees and fee arrangements.65 All of
Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Haverhill] (finding the most important factor that must be
weighed in determining if a settlement would be approved as the “comparison of the get with
the give”).
55. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 70–71 (discussing
the importance of matching “the types of claims and relief and the scope of the release”).
56. In re Family Dollar Stores, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 9985-CB, 2014 WL
7246436, at *19 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2014) (citations omitted).
57. 223 A.2d 384 (Del. 1966).
58. Id. at 388. Although Chrysler actually applied the meritorious-when-filed test to the
fee award calculation process, the court extended this test to settlement review in its
subsequent ruling in Hoffman v. Dann, 205 A.2d 343, 352 (Del. 1964) (considering a
settlement based on a nonmeritorious claim “nothing more than a buying-off of the plaintiffs
for the dismissal of worthless claims”).
59. Chrysler, 223 A.2d at 387.
60. See, e.g., In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 635 (Del. Ch.
2005).
61. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 59, In re Aruba Networks, Inc.
Stockholder Litig., No. 10765-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript of
Settlement Hearing, Aruba Networks] (applying the meritorious-when-filed standard).
62. Sale, supra note 6, at 402.
63. See id. at 402–03, 410 (explaining that judges can use rejection as a tool to establish
templates for “better settlement terms and processes”); see, e.g., Transcript of Settlement
Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 73–75 (rejecting the settlement but providing the parties
with three options of how to proceed, two of which involved returning to the court with a
revised agreement that was within the scope of what he would approve).
64. Sale, supra note 6, at 403–04; see, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 42–43,
In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10020-CB (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 2015) [hereinafter
Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Trulia] (requesting additional briefing by the parties
before making a decision because the Vice Chancellor did not feel comfortable “approving
the settlement on the spot”).
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these means of control allow judges to improve the process and outcomes
of future proposals both in the specific case and in future cases in order to
better serve the interests of shareholders.66
If the settlement is rejected, the parties can go back and revise their
agreement or can voluntarily dismiss the claim with prejudice.67 If it is
approved, the court will certify the class of shareholders and will enter the
settlement as an order of the court, which makes the release of claims valid
in all U.S. jurisdictions.68 Additionally, the court will award the plaintiffs’
attorneys legal fees, which are paid for by the defendants, in addition to
their own legal fees, which are based on the benefit that the plaintiffs were
granted in the settlement.69 At the hearing for approval, objectors are
permitted to voice their concerns about the settlement.70 This is not
common, however, due to the passive nature of shareholders.71
Disclosure-only settlements were initially allowed on the theory that they
provide some kind of value to the shareholders, who take the disclosures
into consideration before making their decision to vote for or against a
merger.72 One study has recently shown, however, that the resulting
disclosures have no impact on the shareholder vote.73 This study highlights
a problem that is exacerbated by the proliferation of M&A litigation and
has resulted in skepticism by both scholars and the courts about these class
action settlements. This also has resulted in certain members of the court
reassessing the scrutiny that they use to review and, even in some cases
reject, settlements.74

65. Sale, supra note 6, at 410; see, e.g., In re Riverbed Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig.,
No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 5458041, at *6–7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (reducing the
plaintiffs’ fee award from what was requested based on the inadequacy of the consideration
that was exchanged for the broad release).
66. See Sale, supra note 6, at 402–04 (describing the powers that judges have to impact
the future of the case and other future cases through their rejection power).
67. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 76 (offering
the parties the option of a dismissal where they receive mootness fees); Transcript of
Settlement Hearing, Haverhill, supra note 54, at 41 (offering the parties the option of a
dismissal where they receive mootness fees).
68. Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 568 n.58 (explaining that the Full Faith and Credit
Clause extends this release to all other jurisdictions); O’Connell et al., supra note 42
(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996) (describing releases as
having “‘full faith and credit’ in other jurisdictions”)).
69. Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 560. The value of attorneys’ fees has skyrocketed in
recent years. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 64–65 (describing
how fees have climbed in recent years and how this has resulted in claims that should be
litigated being happily settled for “a peppercorn and a fee”).
70. 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 13:40 (describing objectors as parties who provide
the court with “an adversarial presentation of the issues under review”).
71. William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1449 (2006).
72. Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 585 (describing the value that the court recognizes in
supplemental disclosures and other nonpecuniary relief).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aruba Networks, supra note 61;
Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27; Transcript of Settlement Hearing,
Haverhill, supra note 54.
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B. Rule 23(e): The Judge’s Fiduciary Role
The federal and Delaware courts have both established procedures that
allow for this class action litigation dance in Rule 23.75 In both the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Delaware Court of Chancery rules, there is
a Rule 23, which contains similar content.76 Rule 23(e) requires judicial
approval for any class action settlement.77 Both courts and legal scholars
have interpreted judicial approval as creating a more active “fiduciary-like
role” for the court.78 This “gatekeeper” role79 charges the judges with the
responsibility to safeguard the interests of absent class members.80 In order
to pass this approval stage, the settling parties have a burden to
“demonstrate that the proposed settlement is a fair compromise.”81
This judicial role is distinct for class actions and is peculiar when
compared to the “neutral arbiter” role that a judge usually plays between
two adversaries.82 This unique role is deemed necessary by the unusual
circumstances that surround a class action settlement. While in a regular
hearing two adversaries present facts to the court, in a class action
settlement hearing the facts are instead presented by two parties who have
settled their differences and are working toward a common goal of

75. 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 13.31. See generally 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra
note 5, § 13:40 (describing the procedures of class action settlements and the outcomes of
the settlements).
76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.
77. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e); DEL. CH. CT. R. 23(e).
78. See, e.g., Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 450 F.3d 745, 748 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he
district court judge functions as ‘a fiduciary of the class, who is subject therefore to the high
duty of care that the law requires of fiduciaries.’” (quoting Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l
Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 2002))); Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Haverhill,
supra note 54, at 31 (“The court is supposed to act in a fiduciary capacity.”); see also Sale,
supra note 6, at 390 (stating that both the federal and Delaware Rule 23(e) assign the judges
an active role in settlements); Gregory W. Werkheiser, Delaware’s New Mandate in Class
Action Settlements: Expanding the Scope and Intensity of Settlement Review, 20 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 496, 496 (1995) (“Chancery court Rule 23[ ] provides for a more active judicial
role in the resolution of class actions.”).
79. See Sale, supra note 6, at 389–91 (describing how the role of a judge relates to that
of a gatekeeper).
80. See In re Amsted Indus., Inc. Litig., 521 A.2d 1104, 1107 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“[T]he
court’s function in the setting of a hearing on the fairness of a settlement is to protect the
interests of absent class members.”); 15A C.J.S. Compromise & Settlement § 28 (2015)
(stating that judicial approval is meant “to protect all unnamed class members from unjust or
unfair settlements”); 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 13:40 (“The settlement process aims to
ensure that the interests of these absent class members are safeguarded.”); Rubenstein, supra
note 71, at 1468 (describing the court’s role in understanding how the terms of the settlement
affect the shareholders); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class
Action Settlements 38 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econs. Research, Working Paper No. 07-34,
2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017266 (considering the court to be the best safeguard of
the class’s interests against class counsel agency) [perma.cc/W4NH-KASC].
81. 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 13.31 (quoting In re FLS Holdings, Inc.
S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 12623, 1993 WL 104562, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr. 2, 1993)).
82. 4 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 5, § 13:40.
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approval.83 This creates an informational asymmetry84 and the risk of
agency problems.85
The informational asymmetry is unique compared to what is typical of a
court proceeding. Normally, the two parties facing each other in an
adversarial hearing are inclined to each serve as a check for the information
provided by the other in order to win the case.86 In a settlement hearing,
however, the two parties’ interests are aligned, and therefore there is no
incentive to clarify or question each other’s information.87 Unless an
objector to the settlement chooses to appear, it is difficult for judges to
obtain the same type of objective criteria that is provided in an adversarial
hearing to assess the value of the settlement.88 Judges are therefore charged
with determining the value of the facts that the parties present when
evaluating the merits of the settlement.89 Often they must still rely in part
on “the good faith of the representative party and . . . their competence”
despite this informational asymmetry.90
The agency costs associated with representative litigation worsen the
informational asymmetry in settlement hearings.
In representative
litigation, there is a general lack of monitoring of attorneys by class
members, including the representative shareholder, because these
shareholders typically have only a small stake in the company and therefore
do not feel inclined to put their resources into the case.91 The lack of
83. See id. (noting that judicial approval is a nonadversarial process because “prior
competing parties . . . have resolved their differences and are now in harmony in seeking the
court’s approval”).
84. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aruba Networks, supra note 61, at 41–42
(stating that the judge “operat[es] in an informational vacuum” during the settlement
hearing); Rubenstein, supra note 71, at 1445 (describing the “remarkable informational
deficit” that judges face in the fairness hearing).
85. See In re Riverbed Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL
5458041, at *1, *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (describing the types of agency problems that
are present in representative litigation); Sale, supra note 6, at 380, 384, 390 (describing the
causes of agency problems and judges’ roles in adjusting for and counteracting them). See
generally 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 13.31 (discussing the agency problems
in class action settlements).
86. See Werkheiser, supra note 78, at 521 (describing the typical adversarial relationship
between parties).
87. See id. (describing a settlement as a relationship “where former opponents are
working together to secure approval of a settlement”); In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig.,
No. 10020-CB, 2016 WL 325008, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016) (describing the litigation for
M&A settlements as having a “non-adversarial character” that rarely contains opposing
viewpoints).
88. Rubenstein, supra note 71, at 1444.
89. 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 13.31; see Trulia, 2016 WL 325008, at *7
(explaining that the lack of adversarial process requires the court to act as “a forensic
examiner of proxy materials [in order to] play devil’s advocate in probing the value [given
to] stockholders” in the settlement); see also In re Amsted Indus., Inc. Litig., 521 A.2d 1104,
1107–08 (Del. Ch. 1986) (describing how the court evaluates a settlement).
90. Amsted Indus., 521 A.2d at 1107–08; 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4,
§ 13.31.
91. See Rubenstein, supra note 71, at 1442 (explaining that class representatives
generally are not supposed to appear or monitor their counsel); Sale, supra note 6, at 384
(describing the shareholders stake as too small to justify regularly monitoring their counsel).
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monitoring further increases the chances of the plaintiff and defense counsel
working together.92 If the plaintiffs’ attorney begins working for his or
herself instead of the class, the agreed upon settlement is likely to include
less benefit for the class than a settlement would otherwise in exchange for
financial benefits that flow directly to that attorney.93 The combination of
these agency costs and the informational asymmetry, which can plague
class action settlements, makes the judicial approval rule significant and
necessary to ensure the protection of the shareholders.
II. THE CHANCERY LOTTERY:
VARYING OPINIONS WITHIN THE JUDICIARY
There has recently been a surge of discussion about the future of
disclosure-only settlements in Delaware.94 This was sparked by a number
of recent decisions in both Delaware and other jurisdictions, where the court
has shown a higher level of scrutiny on disclosure value and release breadth
than in previous cases.95 Some experts have considered this indicative of a
wave of change.96 Despite these signs of change and the candid critiques of
the process by many members of the Court of Chancery, many settlements
that do not provide cognizable benefit to shareholders are nevertheless
approved.97 This part reviews a series of recent settlement decisions made
in Delaware. Part II.A through II.E reviews the decisions of each
chancellor in the Court of Chancery to identify the method of review that
has been used by that chancellor.98 Part II.F analyzes the different amounts
of scrutiny used by the chancellors and how this aligns with their duty to
shareholders.

92. Werkheiser, supra note 78, at 496–97 (describing the inherent dangers of
representative litigation, including collusion between the parties in settlement).
93. 1 BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 4, § 13.31.
94. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
95. For examples of Delaware actions where a high level of scrutiny is used, see
generally Transcript of Settlement Hearing, In re TW Telecom, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No.
9845-CB (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript of Settlement Hearing, TW
Telecom]; In re Riverbed Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL
5458041 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015); Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Trulia, supra note 64;
Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27; Transcript of Settlement Hearing,
In re InterMune, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10086-VCN (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015)
[hereinafter Transcript of Settlement Hearing, InterMune].
96. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
97. See generally Transcript of Settlement Hearing, TW Telecom, supra note 95;
Riverbed Tech., 2015 WL 5458041; Transcript of Settlement Hearing, In re Susser Holdings
Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 9613-VCG (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript
of Settlement Hearing, Susser Holdings]; Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Assad, supra
note 7.
98. There are five members of the Court of Chancery, which is made up of one
chancellor and four vice chancellors. See Judicial Officers of the Court of Chancery, DEL.
ST. CTS., http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/judges.stm (last visited Mar. 27, 2016)
[perma.cc/4AJM-6NZD].
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A. Vice Chancellor Travis Laster’s Intergalactic Disapproval
In three recent decisions, Vice Chancellor Laster rejected settlements that
he believed included overly broad releases. In Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding
Corp.,99 the Vice Chancellor rejected a settlement based on his
determination that the disclosures provided no material value to
shareholders in exchange for an “intergalactic” release.100 He explained
that previously the court was willing to accept disclosure-only settlements
“largely out of sympathy for the defendants” in order to prevent costly
litigation.101 While at the time he considered this a “necessary evil,” he
found that it resulted in plaintiffs’ attorneys filing to get easy money in
exchange for granting defendants broad releases.102 He offered the
attorneys two possibilities for where to go next: they could dismiss the case
for a mootness fee or return with a new settlement that involves a release
that is tailored to fiduciary duty claims.103
Similarly, in Haverhill Retirement System v. Asali,104 Vice Chancellor
Laster felt uncomfortable allowing a settlement with a similarly broad
release where the settlement benefits were “virtually nonexistent” and the
companies had worrisome corporate governance procedures.105 He also
made this decision by comparing the scope of the release to the value of the
consideration.106 The Vice Chancellor considered the release to be a poor
deal for the shareholders, due to the company’s governance practices
creating “simply too many unknown unknowns,” with “the unknown
unknowns [being] too substantial to approve the settlement” in light of such
a broad release.107 While he considered dismissing the case due to
inadequate representation, Vice Chancellor Laster decided to reject the
settlement.108 He offered the parties the same two options that he offered in
Aeroflex, this time saying that he would approve a release that is tailored to
the specific allegations, theories, and issues presented in the complaint.109
Most recently, Vice Chancellor Laster monumentally rejected a
settlement in In re Aruba Networks, Inc. Stockholder Litigation110 by
following through on the threat that he made in Haverhill.111 Vice
Chancellor Laster not only rejected the disclosure-only settlement, but also
dismissed the case altogether based on inadequacy of representation.112 He
explained that the case looked like a “harvesting-of-a-fee opportunity,” due

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

No. 9730-VCL, 2015 WL 4127547 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015).
Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 15, 73.
Id. at 63–64.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 74.
No. 9474-VCL, 2015 WL 3582361 (Del. Ch. June 8, 2015).
Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Haverhill, supra note 54, at 39, 43.
Id. at 36–39.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 42.
No. 10765-VCL, 2015 WL 5924767 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015).
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aruba Networks, supra note 61, at 73–74.
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to the lack of basis at filing and, because even though the plaintiffs then
found something that was litigable, they instead chose to settle for
disclosure and a fee.113 The Vice Chancellor was troubled by the amount of
mistakes in the plaintiffs’ brief, despite the brief being the factual record
that the court relies on to make a judgment.114 In reviewing the settlement
consideration, he focused heavily on the scope of the release, which he
considered overly broad.115 Vice Chancellor Laster also focused on the fact
that the disclosures offered were just not enough and were “not helpful at
all.”116 He said that the court had reached a point where it was necessary to
acknowledge that allowing disclosure-only settlements in exchange for an
expansive release “created a real systemic problem”117 and described a
better alternative: using a release that only covers the scope of the
disclosures.118
Vice Chancellor Laster offered a variety of explanations for the high
scrutiny he used in these three cases. He explained that the court has a
fiduciary role to “look out for the interests of the class” by ensuring that the
settlement is “within a range of reasonableness,” which he defines as a
settlement that “a client, in possession of the information and not under any
compulsion, could reasonably accept.”119 He considered factors such as a
recent study that shows a lack of significant benefit to stockholders for
settlement disclosures120 and the impact that broad releases can have by
barring future cases, such as unknown antitrust and securities claims related
to that merger.121 Vice Chancellor Laster also acknowledged that other
state courts, particularly in New York, recently had used a similarly high
level of scrutiny to review disclosure-only settlements.122

113. Id. at 73.
114. See id. at 40–47 (describing the importance of being accurate in court documents due
to the judge relying on them for facts).
115. See id. at 26–40, 65–66.
116. Id. at 74–75 (“[W]hen I get objections from class members, they look at the
disclosure that you guys got for them and say, ‘What is this about? We don’t need this. This
is not helpful at all.’ You probably don’t think what I’ve told you is helpful at all. That’s
fine. But you’ve had the benefit of disclosure.”).
117. Id. at 65.
118. Id. at 66.
119. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Haverhill, supra note 54, at 32.
120. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 64–65 (referring to
Fisch et. al., supra note 3, at 586–87, which determines that disclosure-only settlements do
not provide any identifiable benefit).
121. See id. at 66.
122. Id. at 68. It is likely that Laster was referring to two recent high profile New York
cases: City Trading Fund v. Nye, No. 651668/2014, 2015 WL 93894 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 7,
2015), and Gordon v. Verizon Communications, No. 653084/13, 2014 WL 7250212 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 2014), aff’d, 2015 WL 3610912 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 31, 2015). In City
Trading Fund, Justice Kornreich rejected a settlement with a broad release and weak
disclosures using a strict standard to determine materiality. See 2015 WL 93894, at *6, *12,
*19. Justice Kornreich referred to her role as a “gatekeeper” who protects from litigation
that “unjustifiably extract[s] money from shareholders, who get no benefit from the litigation
but nonetheless end up paying two sets of attorneys.” Id. at *20. In Gordon, Justice
Schweitzer rejected a settlement where disclosures were trivial and redundant. See 2014 WL
7250212, at *13–15. Justice Schweitzer utilized similar explanations to Vice Chancellor
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B. Chancellor Andre Bouchard’s Changing Tune
Chancellor Bouchard has a significant role in resolving the debate on
how the Court of Chancery should handle disclosure-only settlements. As
Chancellor, he has the sole discretion to assign cases to each member of the
court and has the respect of the Vice Chancellors, which might influence
their decisions.123 Throughout 2015, Chancellor Bouchard has shown the
most change in how he personally reviews disclosure-only settlements.
In two hearings on the same day in August 2015, Chancellor Bouchard
approved settlements for both Assad v. World Energy Solutions, Inc.124 and
In re TW Telecom, Inc. Stockholder Litigation.125 In Assad, he approved a
settlement despite expressing his growing concern over the scope of
releases in settlements that cover unknown claims.126 Chancellor Bouchard
provided an example of how releasing such broad claims could go wrong
by presenting a hypothetical in which cash flow information added in the
supplemental disclosure ended up being fraudulent.127 He thus showed that
even a reasonable claim relating to this fraud would be released.128 He also
concluded that the disclosures were based on public information or
previously disclosed facts, except for one that had “meaningful
information.”129 At the end of his review, Chancellor Bouchard stated that
there would be more scrutiny on settlement consideration in settlements
going forward.130
In TW Telecom, Chancellor Bouchard approved another settlement,
despite expressing his concern over approving a settlement where the deal
consideration was weak for shareholders.131 He referred to two of the
plaintiffs’ top disclosures as neither “remotely important” nor material.132
He also considered the release to be overly broad because it included
unknown claims, federal claims, and claims based on “any allegations in
[the] complaint.”133 Chancellor Bouchard said that the quality of what was
obtained for the release was not great and that this was the closest he had
been to rejecting a settlement during his time as Chancellor.134 Despite
this, Chancellor Bouchard reluctantly considered the small amount of value
worthy of approval and stated that the settlement was “under the
circumstances . . . fair and reasonable.”135 He again warned that these
Laster. See id. at *2 (referring to Fisch et. al., supra note 3, at 586–87); see also supra note
120 and accompanying text.
123. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aruba Networks, supra note 61, at 72 (stating that
the Chancellor gets sole discretion as to which cases are assigned to which judge).
124. No. 10324-CB, 2015 WL 4977604 (Del. Ch. Aug. 20, 2015).
125. No. 9845-CB (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015).
126. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Assad, supra note 7, at 31.
127. Id. at 33–34.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 17–22, 42.
130. Id. at 40.
131. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, TW Telecom, supra note 95, at 51.
132. Id. at 17, 36.
133. Id. at 31.
134. See id. at 47 (stating that only one disclosure provided any real value).
135. Id. at 51.
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settlements will face more scrutiny from the court in the future and that the
attorneys should be ready to explain why the disclosures matter in the real
world.136
Chancellor Bouchard’s concern regarding the overly broad releases being
offered in disclosure-only settlements came to a breaking point in his
review of In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholders Litigation,137 where he withheld
judgment on what he considered to be “the underbelly of settlements”
because he did not feel comfortable coming to a decision during the
hearing.138 The Chancellor was concerned about the unknown claims
included in the release.139 He also focused on the fact that the
supplementary disclosures provided information that was, for the most part,
already public information.140 To explain his concern, the Chancellor cited
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein,141 a Supreme Court case
where litigation over a valid securities claim that may have had a large
payout to the class was barred due to a global release that was bargained for
in a Delaware class action settlement.142 Based on these concerns,
Chancellor Bouchard requested additional briefing from the attorneys on
two issues.143 The issues were: (1) which standard of materiality the court
has to apply in assessing the value of the supplemental disclosures, and (2)
whether it makes sense for the court to endorse releases that include
unknown claims.144
Chancellor Bouchard later released a landmark opinion in Trulia, where
he not only rejected the settlement but instructed the court to be
“increasingly vigilant in scrutinizing the ‘give’ and the ‘get’
of . . . settlements to ensure that they are genuinely fair and reasonable to
the absent class members.”145 He warned practitioners that they should
expect disclosure settlements to be disfavored by the court in the future
unless supplemental disclosures address “plainly material misrepresentation
or omission [and the] release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass
nothing more than disclosure claims and fiduciary duty claims concerning
the sale process” and only in circumstances where those “claims have been
investigated sufficiently.”146 He said that the decision of whether

136. Id. at 44.
137. No. 10020-CB, 2016 WL 325008 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016).
138. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Trulia, supra note 64, at 40–43.
139. Id. at 30.
140. Id. at 20–21.
141. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
142. See id. at 385–86, 390–91 (holding that the plaintiffs could not litigate valid claims
based on unequal treatment in the tender offer for certain insiders due to the preclusive effect
of the global release from a Delaware class action settlement that the court approved).
143. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Trulia, supra note 64, at 40, 43.
144. Id. at 43–44; see also id. at 31–38 (discussing Chancellor Bouchard’s concern over
which standard of materiality he should be applying because he did not have confidence in
the answer).
145. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 10020-CB, 2016 WL 325008, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 22, 2016).
146. Id. at *10.
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something is material or immaterial should not be a close call under the new
“plainly material” standard.147
C. Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock Warns
That Change Is Coming, Soon
In two recent cases, Vice Chancellor Glasscock reacted similarly to
Chancellor Bouchard’s earlier decisions in 2015. He also warned attorneys
that settlements will soon be reviewed differently, but provided more clarity
on his reasoning for delaying this new scrutiny when he approved both
settlements.
In In re Riverbed Technology, Inc. Stockholders Litigation,148 the Vice
Chancellor approved a settlement with “meager benefit” achieved for the
class and a broad release.149 While he appeared persuaded by the objector,
who argued that the settlement should be rejected because there may be
valuable unknown claims extinguished by the release, he approved the
settlement based on the attorneys’ “reasonable expectation” that the court
would approve a “very broad, but hardly unprecedented, release.”150 He
granted approval despite calling the benefit achieved “a mustard seed”151
and the breadth of the release troubling152 and stating that “the interests of
the Class might merit rejection of a settlement encompassing a release that
goes far beyond the claims asserted and the results achieved.”153 Vice
Chancellor Glasscock determined that the “reasonable reliance of the
parties on formerly settled practices” warranted his approval.154 He warned
that the reasonableness of these expectations, however, would be
diminished or eliminated going forward.155
Vice Chancellor Glasscock similarly approved a settlement in In re
Susser Holdings Corp. Stockholder Litigation156 based on the parties’
expectations.157 This settlement included a release that was notably
narrower than the one in Riverbed, as it was represented as applying only to
shareholders of Susser and therefore only applied to litigation that could
arise from issues prior to the closing.158 In this case, however, the
147. Id.
148. No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL 5458041 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015).
149. Id. at *6.
150. Id.
151. See id. (“If I may describe what has been achieved for the Class as a peppercorn,
what has been released looks more like a mustard seed.”). The term “peppercorn” comes
from the words used by a famous jurist to refer to a settlement where the benefit is “often
worth no more . . . than a ‘peppercorn.’” Fisch et al., supra note 3, at 559.
152. Riverbed, 2015 WL 5458041, at *6 (“It is hubristic to believe that upon this record I
can properly evaluate, and dismiss as insubstantial, all potential Federal and State claims.”).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. No. 9613-VCG, 2015 WL 5444524 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2015).
157. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Susser Holdings, supra note 97, at 57 (stating that
settlement expectations were “growing less and less reasonable” going forward based on the
court’s concern over broad releases).
158. Id. at 27, 57.
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defendants disputed the fee requested by the plaintiffs’ attorneys, stating
that while the settlement should be approved, the disclosures were not
material and therefore were not worth a high fee.159 Vice Chancellor
Glasscock was concerned that the defendants considered the disclosures to
be immaterial.160 He recognized that the defendants were asking to get
something of value, while contesting the value of what the class was getting
in return.161 Vice Chancellor Glasscock stated that the parties’ expectations
were becoming “less and less reasonable” moving forward despite
approving the settlement once again on these expectations.162
During the hearing for In re Silicon Image, Inc. Stockholders
Litigation,163 the Vice Chancellor approved a settlement that he said he
would be unlikely to approve if it was filed after July 2015.164 This
decision set up a starting point for what Vice Chancellor Glasscock
perceives as when the attorney’s reasonable expectations will no longer be
reasonable. It is presumable that he is using July 2015 as the starting point
for a heightened review because this is when Aeroflex was decided.165 Vice
Chancellor Glasscock determined that there are now two categories of
settlements: ones where “settlement was entered with notice of the
[c]ourt’s concerns post-July” and settlements that were entered prior—and
that these two categories will be reviewed differently.166
D. Vice Chancellor John Noble’s Unclear Stance
In the recent hearing for In re InterMune, Inc. Stockholder Litigation,167
held on the same day as Aeroflex, Vice Chancellor Noble made headlines
when he withheld approval of a settlement.168 He showed concern over the
broad scope of the release that was granted when compared to the small
value of the disclosures that were obtained169 and discussed his general
concern over the fairness of allowing global releases.170 During this
159. See id. at 30–37 (explaining the defendant’s argument as saying that the disclosures
were immaterial, however, the disclosure still had some kind of value that therefore made the
settlement worth approving).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 33.
162. Id. at 57.
163. No. 10601-VCG, 2015 WL 8482918 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2015).
164. Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 55, In re Silicon Image, Inc. Stockholders Litig.,
No. 10601-VCG (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2015) [hereinafter Transcript of Settlement Hearing,
Silicon Image].
165. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
166. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Silicon Image, supra note 164, at 54.
167. No. 10086-VCN, 2015 WL 9481182 (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2015).
168. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, InterMune, supra note 95, at 17; see, e.g.,
LaCroix, supra note 9; David Marcus, Delaware Appraisal and Judicial Activism, DEAL
PIPELINE (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.thedeal.com/content/ regulatory/delaware–appraisal–
and–judicial–activism.php [perma.cc/55TL-ZSA3].
169. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, InterMune, supra note 95, at 17 (questioning
why the facts in the case justify a broad release instead of being limited to disclosure
claims).
170. See id. at 28–32 (“[I]f it’s a disclosure case, why shouldn’t the release go to what the
case was destined to be, which is disclosure?”).
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hearing, the Vice Chancellor decided to reserve his judgment, which was
perceived by the media as signaling the Vice Chancellor’s intention to use a
high level of scrutiny in reviewing disclosure-only settlements with broad
releases moving forward.171
Despite many interpreting Vice Chancellor Noble’s actions this way, his
decision to approve the settlement in In re Carefusion Stockholders
Litigation172 applied a level of scrutiny that was closer to the relaxed
standard accepted in the past.173 He approved the settlement despite only
finding the supplemental disclosures “helpful and perhaps clarifying” and
explained that sometimes a global release makes sense, even if in some
cases the shareholders are not offered meaningful recovery.174 Throughout
the hearing, the Vice Chancellor only once expressed concern over the
breadth of the release.175 Vice Chancellor Noble responded to his own
concerns in InterMune by saying that “[t]here will always be the
risk . . . that some viable claim of the shareholder class will be unwisely
released [because a]bsolute certainty simply is not a realistic goal.”176 He
also discounted the court’s overall concern that some attorneys try to “settle
quickly and cheaply to collect a fee” by saying that it “may simply be
somewhat too cynical.”177
This much lower level of scrutiny of the settlement consideration was in
line with the final decision in InterMune that was announced after
Carefusion. Vice Chancellor Noble approved the settlement as fair,
reasonable, and “in the best interests of the class” despite saying that the
disclosures only “marginally satisf[ied] the materiality standard.”178 Prior
to making his decision, the Vice Chancellor discussed the possibility of
limiting the scope of a release to the supplemental disclosures and
explained that releases that go beyond this breadth require a careful
assessment to ensure that there is no relief available.179 He also discussed
the troubling nature of including unknown claims based on the fact that
they require class members to “give up something . . . without a full
appreciation of what they may be surrendering.”180 Despite mentioning
171. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 9 (including InterMune among recent cases that indicate
“game over” for settlements that extract fee awards in exchange for a broad release);
Marcus, supra note 168 (raising the question of whether InterMune is going to create major
change in Delaware’s global release policy); O’Connell et al., supra note 42 (including Vice
Chancellor Noble’s InterMune with Vice Chancellor Laster’s recent decisions in a
description of Delaware’s increased scrutiny on settlements and releases).
172. No. 10214-VCN, 2015 WL 5471250 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015).
173. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Carefusion, supra note 7, at 18–19.
174. Id. at 49–51.
175. See id. at 18–19 (questioning the plaintiffs’ lack of concern over potential unknown
claims by saying that the defendants must be worried about some potential claim to include
all unknown claims and that this worry might be worth figuring out).
176. Id. at 47.
177. Id.
178. Transcript of Telephonic Bench Ruling on Settlement Hearing at 6, 11, 13, In re
InterMune, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 10086-VCN (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2015) [hereinafter
Transcript of Telephonic Bench Ruling on Settlement Hearing, InterMune].
179. Id. at 5.
180. Id. at 7.

2016] THE CHANGING ODDS OF THE CHANCERY LOTTERY

2401

these concerns, Vice Chancellor Noble chose to revise his previous
perceptions on the case and accept the counsel’s original explanations due
to “predictability and consistency” having value and declined to reject the
settlement based on his release concerns.181
E. The New Vice Chancellor: Tamika Montgomery-Reeves
The Delaware Court of Chancery has fairly low turnover, but when Vice
Chancellor Donald Parsons announced his retirement in October 2015, a
new Vice Chancellor was nominated.182 The Delaware Senate confirmed
the appointment of Tamika Montgomery-Reeves as the next Vice
Chancellor.183 She is a former clerk of the former Chancellor William B.
Chandler III and has eight years of experience working in corporate law.184
She is one of the youngest vice chancellors to be appointed to the court and
is the first African-American, and the second woman, to serve.185 She has
experience with M&A litigation and disclosure-only settlements, even
recently being on the defense for Riverbed.186 Due to her recent
instatement as a vice chancellor, Vice Chancellor Montgomery-Reeves has
not reviewed any M&A settlements to date. Only time will tell how she
will apply her fiduciary role and which level of scrutiny she will use in
reviewing class action settlements.
F. The Court of Chancery’s Unclear Standard
and Its Fiduciary Reality
The recent Delaware cases show that there is a trend within the court to at
least consider a higher level of scrutiny in reviewing and comparing the
“give” and “get” of settlements.187 The heightened analysis does not
always come across in the final decision, which more often than not is
approval of the settlement even when the give is considered weak.188 This
disparity raises questions about how effective the review process is in the
Delaware Court of Chancery, as well as how the court as a whole is
fulfilling its fiduciary duty when it approves settlements that only offer
minor benefit to the shareholders while providing defendants with a broad

181. Id. at 9, 15.
182. Tom McParland, Montgomery-Reeves Confirmed by Senate to Del. Court of
Chancery, AM. LAW. (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=1202740991656/
MontgomeryReeves–Confirmed–by–Senate–to–Del–court–of–Chancery?mcode=0&curin
dex=0&curpage=ALL [perma.cc/66WN-WW9V].
183. Id.
184. Id. (mentioning her eight years working at Weil, Gotshal & Manges and Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati in corporate law).
185. Id.
186. Chelsea Naso, Del. Opinion Spells an End to Disclosure-Only Settlements, LAW360
(Sept. 18, 2015, 7:18 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/704591/del–opinion–spells–an–
end–to–disclosure–only–settlements [perma.cc/49B2-N3PJ].
187. In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1043 (Del. Ch.
2015) (describing one of the court’s roles as “assessing the reasonableness of the ‘give’ and
the ‘get,’ as well as the allocation of the ‘get’ among various claimants”).
188. See supra notes 126–29, 131–32, 149, 174, 178 and accompanying text.
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release.189 The recent cases reviewed earlier in this part are analyzed below
based on their application of the court’s fiduciary duty.
A number of chancellors have chosen to approve settlements in which
they indicate clear concern over the balance of benefit and cost for the
shareholders.190 This is difficult to reconcile with the chancellors’
fiduciary-like role. Vice Chancellor Glasscock’s approval of cases like
Riverbed and Susser was based on the expectations of the attorneys who file
and defend against these lawsuits. The choice to protect the attorneys’
expectations conflicts with the purpose behind this required stage of
approval, which is to protect shareholders from situations where plaintiffs
and defendants may potentially work together to serve their interests over
the classes’ interest.191 By approving a settlement with “meager” benefit,
or where the defendants admit that the disclosures are not material, the
absent shareholders’ interests do not appear protected.192
Chancellor Bouchard, however, despite similarly approving settlements
in which he showed clear concern, progressed toward establishing a new
standard in Trulia. When he warned in TW Telecom that attorneys would
soon have to face more scrutiny from the court, Chancellor Bouchard
indicated that he would not continue to approve settlements so easily in the
future.193 He then affirmed this change in scrutiny when he withheld
approval and subsequently rejected the settlement in Trulia.194 He made it
clear that his goal is to establish a firmer materiality standard for the court
to apply consistently and to limit the scope of releases that are approved in
cases where the consideration is only disclosure.195 Chancellor Bouchard’s
actions indicate that he is aware that the previous standard that he has
applied to review settlements is not clearly aligned with his fiduciary duty
to shareholders and that he is committed to establishing a new standard that
better reflects this role.196
Vice Chancellor Noble’s application of his fiduciary duty is the hardest
to read. When the InterMune hearing occurred, many believed that Vice
Chancellor Noble was joining Vice Chancellor Laster in generally

189. See Sale, supra note 6, at 389–91.
190. See supra Part II.B–D.
191. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
192. See In re Riverbed Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 WL
5458041, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (approving the settlement despite “the rather
meager benefit achieved . . . for the [c]lass”); see also supra Part II.C. See generally
Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Susser Holdings, supra note 97 (approving a settlement
even though the defendants argued that it was immaterial in order to reduce plaintiffs’ fee
award).
193. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, TW Telecom, supra note 95, at 44 (stating that
disclosure settlements need to be scrutinized more in future cases); see also supra note 136
and accompanying text.
194. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Trulia, supra note 64, at 42–44; In re Trulia, Inc.
Stockholder Litig., No. 10020-CB, 2016 WL 325008, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016); see also
supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
195. See Trulia, 2016 WL 325008, at *10; see also supra notes 145–47 and
accompanying text.
196. See supra Part II.B.
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disapproving of disclosure as fair consideration for a broad release.197
After Carefusion, however, this became unclear. In Carefusion, Vice
Chancellor Noble applied very little scrutiny to review the settlement terms
and discounted many of the court’s concerns as unrealistic and “too
cynical.”198 The decision in InterMune further confused Vice Chancellor
Noble’s unclear standard, because the decision indicated that he still
believed in his criticisms of the broad release, but was unwilling to reject
the settlement based on that concern.199 Vice Chancellor Noble’s manner
of settlement review makes it difficult to determine his method of applying
his duty as a fiduciary to shareholders. Due to Vice Chancellor Noble
announcing his retirement just two months after the Carefusion hearing, his
scrutiny is unlikely to be fully explained before he leaves the bench.200
Finally, Vice Chancellor Laster’s recent decisions suggest that he
interprets his role as a class fiduciary to require rejecting settlements that
provide little or no benefit for the shareholder class. By rejecting the three
settlements discussed above and utilizing a high level of scrutiny on the
value of the disclosure that was offered in exchange for a broad release, it is
clear that Vice Chancellor Laster will not acquiesce to the court’s past
practices or attorney expectations at the expense of protecting the absent
shareholders.201 By rejecting settlements that do not align with his
fiduciary role, Vice Chancellor Laster has triggered a number of voluntary
dismissals,202 thus improving the process and outcomes of future proposals
to better serve the interests of shareholders.203
While other members of the court have focused on attorneys’
expectations, it appears that Vice Chancellor Laster is changing the
expectations of those same attorneys. It is likely that these attorneys
understand that their cases will not meet Vice Chancellor Laster’s scrutiny
if they have the typical elements of a disclosure-only settlement and
therefore will only proceed with settlements that provide more substantial
consideration for shareholders. A recent analysis of filings in the Delaware
courts alludes to the impact of Vice Chancellor Laster’s rejection power by

197. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text.
198. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Carefusion, supra note 7, at 47; see supra notes
173–74 and accompanying text.
199. Transcript of Telephonic Bench Ruling on Settlement Hearing, InterMune, supra
note 178, at 9; see also supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text.
200. Press Release, Del. Court of Chancery, Vice Chancellor John Noble to Retire in
February (Nov. 19, 2015), http://courts.delaware.gov/forms/download.aspx?id=84048
(announcing that the Vice Chancellor will retire in February) [perma.cc/9T5F-WTD3].
201. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aeroflex, supra note 27, at 63–64.
202. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aruba Networks, supra note 61, at 72 (“I
would say I also have, by far, the highest incidence of assign and dismiss. So seven or eight
cases will get filed on a deal. The Chancellor . . . assigns it to me. Boom. I see seven
notices of dismissal.”); see also, e.g., Casey v. Hospira, Inc., No. 10630-VCL, 2015 WL
5032516 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2015) (dismissed); Hyer v. Rally Software Dev. Corp., No.
11109-VCL, 2015 WL 6697313 (Del. Ch. Nov. 2, 2015) (dismissed); In re Emulex Corp.
Stockholders Litig., 10743-VCL, 2015 WL 3582347 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2015) (dismissed).
203. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text.
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showing a lower ratio of class action cases compared to the number of deals
that were announced during October and November 2015.204
III. INTEREST GROUP THEORY
AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE DELAWARE BAR
This part describes and applies a potential explanation for the disparate
application of the court’s fiduciary duty amongst the chancellors. Part III.A
discusses the interest group theory and the structural mechanisms in
Delaware that establish and define this theory. Part III.B provides an
example of how the theory’s lead interest group uses its influence over the
decisions of the Delaware Court of Chancery and how that influence affects
the delicate balance of the court. Part III.C applies this theory to the current
members of the court and their recent decisions.
A. The Interest Group Theory
One theory that may account for the divergent approaches to disclosureonly settlements of various members of the Court of Chancery is “interest
group theory,” first described by Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller
and subsequently elaborated on by others.205 In their article, Macey and
Miller form a theory that explains the influence of interest groups over the
Delaware legislature and judiciary.206 The main interest group that they
refer to is the Delaware Bar Association, which has “strong incentives to
lobby for laws that transfer wealth from the public to themselves.”207
To better understand this theory, it is essential to understand the
underpinnings of Delaware’s legal system. The Delaware General
Corporate Law (DGCL) is the compilation of all of Delaware’s corporate
law statutes.208 These laws can only be changed or amended with a twothirds vote of both the Delaware Senate and House of Representatives.209
The Delaware General Assembly does not internally assess the need for
DGCL amendments or write the actual amendments.210 Instead, the
Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association has this
responsibility.211 This council is made up of twenty-one members who are
elected annually and consists of nominees selected by the seven biggest
204. Post-Aruba Class Action Filings in the Court of Chancery (Nov. 13, 2015) (on file
with The Chancery Daily), http://us7.campaign-archive1.com/?u=1db63475183f3a61b
32348447&id=6a2c623a03&e=f68a851e4f (supporting statistics available at https://www.
dropbox.com/s/6yrrgib231ho6mf/STOCKHOLDER%20CLASS%20ACTIONS%202015.pd
f?dl=0) [perma.cc/K7BX-FCR9]. This represents the period that directly followed
Chancellor Laster’s Aruba decision.
205. See generally Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an
Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85 (1990); Macey & Miller,
supra note 2.
206. See Macey & Miller, supra note 2 at 498–507.
207. Id. at 499.
208. Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 1752.
209. Id. at 1753.
210. Id. at 1754.
211. Id. at 1755.
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commercial law firms in Wilmington, Delaware, and other smaller firms
from the area.212 This council also includes a small minority of plaintiffs’
attorneys,213 Lawrence A. Hamermesh, who is a professor at Widener Law
School,214 and one Skadden Arps attorney.215 These members meet in
private and do not make any of their discussions or writings publicly
available until the council submits the amendments to the Delaware Bar
The amendments are then
Association’s Executive Committee.216
submitted to the General Assembly for their respective approval, which is
usually granted anonymously.217 This process does not provide for any
input from or meetings with the Delaware Court of Chancery judges, but
there is a longstanding policy to consciously avoid proposing legislation
that would impact litigation pending in the court, either directly or
indirectly.218 The legislative process follows “a common law approach,
waiting to see how specific cases develop . . . before determining . . . [if
any] legislative solution would be useful.”219 This style of lawmaking
provides the court with a great deal of discretion and a focus on the
complex facts of individual cases instead of black letter law.220 These
principles are dependent upon the theory that “courts will police overly
opportunistic behavior on the part of those in control.”221
While the Macey and Miller article argues that Delaware judges are
partially insulated from the interest group pressures that the legislature
faces, they did find that the judiciary is partially responsive to these
pressures.222 This is contrary to the opinion of Professor William Cary,
who found that the judiciary is “extremely responsive to the interests of the
Delaware Bar.”223 Despite being in overall agreement with Macey and
Miller’s theory, Douglas M. Branson appears to side closer to Cary on this
debate, suggesting that not only does the Delaware bar have a strong
influence on the Delaware Court of Chancery, but that this influence is
motivated by the plaintiff bar’s interest in eliminating hurdles for bringing
suit and ensuring that settlements will be approved in exchange for
handsome attorneys fees.224 Branson backs up his theory with a study that
finds numerous time periods in which the court’s decisions visibly focused
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1756 & n.25.
214. Widener Law School is located in Wilmington, Delaware, and it is the only law
school in Delaware.
215. Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 1755–56, 1755 n.25.
216. Id. at 1756.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1757–58.
219. Id. at 1773.
220. See id. at 1777 (finding that judicial deference is based on broader principles “than a
desire to avoid legislative intrusion,” but instead on the “idea that legal issues that depend for
their resolution on complex facts cannot and should not be reduced to black letter
codification”).
221. Id. at 1784 (describing the purpose of the “legislative preference for flexibility and
private ordering”).
222. Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 500.
223. Id. at 499.
224. Branson, supra note 205, at 91–92.
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on shareholder interests, despite strong indeterminacy in Delaware’s law.225
He found that these periods of shareholder interest-focused decision making
indicate the plaintiff bar’s influence on the court.226 Despite their
contrasting opinion, Macey and Miller do recognize that the Delaware
courts further the goals of this interest group through their statutory
interpretation and through their ties to the organization from personal and
professional contacts.227 As many members of the Delaware courts are
previously from firms that represent corporations that are registered in
Delaware, they are likely to be unconsciously in alignment and therefore are
likely to approve rules that serve the corporate bar’s interests.228
Additionally, many of the judges are also likely to return to practice at the
same group of firms when their time in the court ends.229 This generates a
personal and professional interest in sustaining relationships with the
lawyers at top law firms who bring cases in the Delaware courts and may
cause a similar alignment between their decisions and those firms’ interests.
B. Fee-Shifting Bylaws: An Example of the Relationship Between
the Delaware Courts and Bar Association
The risk of teetering this fragile relationship can best be explained
through example. In 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion
in which it allowed Delaware corporations to adopt fee-shifting bylaws.230
This established the ability of Delaware corporations to amend their bylaws
to establish a “loser pays” system for shareholder litigation.231 In
representative litigation, plaintiffs’ attorneys take on class actions through
contingency fees, which place all of the monetary risk on the attorneys and
their firms.232 This allows for suits that plaintiffs would not bring to court
otherwise due to the small individual interest of each member of the
class.233 Under this bylaw, the attorneys and firms would also become
liable to pay the defendant corporation’s full defense costs if the plaintiffs
225. Id. at 111.
226. Id.
227. Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 502.
228. Id.
229. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, InterMune, supra note 95, at 24–25 (“[If]
Your Honor decides to leave the bench, he is going to make plenty of money at the end of
the day when one of these big Delaware defense firms picks him up if that’s what you so
choose to do at the later part of your career.”). As the attorney in InterMune alluded to, it is
not uncommon for members of the Court of Chancery to resume the practice of law at a
large law firm after they leave the bench. Two examples of this are former Chancellor
Chandler and former Vice Chancellor Lamb. See Stephen P. Lamb, PAUL WEISS,
http://www.paulweiss.com/professionals/partners-and-counsel/stephen-p-lamb.aspx
(last
visited Mar. 27, 2016) [perma.cc/9RVJ-URG3]; William B. Chandler III, WILSON SONSINI
GOODRICH & ROSATI, https://www.wsgr.com/wsgr/DBIndex.aspx?SectionName=attorneys/
BIOS/12348.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [perma.cc/4SSS-23UY].
230. Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation
by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2015) (discussing the holding of
ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554 (Del. 2014)).
231. Id. at 3.
232. Id. at 3 & nn.11–12.
233. Id.
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lose the case.234 The purpose of allowing this bylaw was to deter
shareholder claims that are frivolous by making plaintiffs’ attorneys more
selective in which cases they bring to the court.235 Within two weeks of
this decision, the Delaware Bar Association’s Executive Committee had
crafted an amendment to the DGCL to reverse this holding.236
This amendment is a clear example of the delicate relationship that the
court has with the Delaware bar. Due to the Delaware bar’s ability to craft
legislation, they have a large amount of power to redefine the decisions of
the Delaware courts.237 The court appears aware of this power, and
therefore is likely to take this risk into consideration in every decision that it
makes. While on occasion the court chooses to make a decision that is
likely at odds with the Delaware bar’s interests, such as the choice to adopt
a fee-shifting doctrine, the court generally is sensitive to the risk of the
Delaware bar reacting and using its influence over the legislature to reverse
its decisions.238
C. Applying the Interest Group Theory to Delaware’s Reality
The interest group theory helps to explain the inconsistencies between
the settlement review processes that many of the members of the court use
and the method by which they apply their fiduciary duty. The Delaware bar
is a core interest group that is likely to have influence over many of the
choices made by the Delaware judiciary.239 This group’s influence can be
seen in the shifting sands of disclosure-only settlements.240 Certain
members of the Court of Chancery have attitudes that reflect a great deal of
respect for this interest, while others do not.
Vice Chancellor Glasscock expressly has considered the interests of the
Delaware Bar Association in his recent decisions. His decision to withhold
applying a heightened review process to settlements in cases where the
complaint was filed before July 2015 was based upon the “reasonable
expectations” of the attorneys who filed the cases.241 In contrast, Vice

234. Id.
235. See id. at 27.
236. Id. at 3–4; see also S. 236, 147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2014)
(“Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, neither the certificate of incorporation
nor the bylaws of any corporation may impose monetary liability . . . on any stockholder of
the corporation.”). This amendment was adopted by the legislature and began a ban on fee
shifting bylaws as of August 1, 2015. Laura D. Richman & Andrew Noreuil, DGCL
Amendments Authorize Exclusive Forum Provisions and Prohibit Fee-Shifting Provisions,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 6, 2015), http://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2015/07/06/dgcl-amendments-authorize-exclusive-forum-provisions-andprohibit-fee-shifting-provisions [perma.cc/XZP8-SYRG].
237. See supra notes 206–19 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 220–22 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 220–22 and accompanying text.
240. See supra Part II.
241. See supra Part II.C; see also Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Silicon Image, supra
note 164, at 38 (describing the current period as an interim period while the court’s process
is being reevaluated, making attorneys’ expectations still reasonable based on the previous
process).
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Chancellor Laster does not appear to take the interests of the Delaware Bar
Association into consideration when reviewing settlements. Instead, Vice
Chancellor Laster has indicated that he does not mind that the attorneys on
either side of settlements do not favor him.242 He appears unalarmed by
this interest group influence, which allows him to act as a leader in M&A
litigation reform, a role that has also provided him with the unfavorable
reputation of being a judicial activist.243 One recent article referred to Vice
Chancellor Laster’s actions as a leader in the increasingly aggressive
rejection of disclosure-only settlements as an example of judicial
activism.244 While this is one interpretation of what Vice Chancellor Laster
is doing, another may be that he is exercising his statutorily imposed
fiduciary duty to protect shareholder interests and is resisting the pressures
of the Delaware Bar Association.
As the other members of the court have not expressly reflected on this
influence, the extent to which the Delaware Bar Association influences their
decision-making process is difficult to assess. The collective slow shift by
the court from making candid critiques of the process to applying those
critiques to their decisions, however, reflects that the majority of the court
is taking these interests into consideration.245 The slow pace of change
allows for a more subtle warning to be made to the Delaware Bar
Association before the changes materialize, thereby protecting the delicate
balance that exists between this interest group and the judiciary.246
IV. A NEW STANDARD FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF SETTLEMENTS IN M&A LITIGATION
As is recognized by a majority of the Court of Chancery, there is a clear
need for the chancellors to take a closer look at disclosure-only settlements
before deciding whether to approve or reject them.247 This part proposes a
new standard for settlement review that will establish more consistency and
a focus on the court’s fiduciary duty to protect absent shareholders’
interests. Part IV.A explains the underlying policy implications of the
current system and why it requires a new standard. Part IV.B proposes a
new standard of materiality modeled after Chrysler. Part IV.C proposes a
stricter standard for release breadth that allows tailored releases in
proportion to the case being settled.
242. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aruba Networks, supra note 61, at 74 (stating
that Vice Chancellor Laster is not offended by the fact that attorneys always dismiss cases
when he is assigned because their “junky” cases are a waste of judicial resources).
243. Marcus, supra note 168 (referring to Vice Chancellor Laster as an example of
judicial activism).
244. Id. (defining judicial activism as “a court’s willingness to overturn laws or venture
into areas of social policy”).
245. See, e.g., Transcript of Telephonic Bench Ruling on Settlement Hearing, InterMune,
supra note 178, at 9 (showing Vice Chancellor Noble revising his previous concerns over the
release provided in the settlement based on the value of “predictability and
consistency . . . in a venue such as [the Delaware courts]”).
246. See supra Part III.B.
247. See supra Part III.A–C.
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A. Policy Rationales for a New Standard of Review
Delaware’s choice to adopt a version of Rule 23 that requires judicial
approval, combined with the court’s choice to interpret this rule as requiring
the court to act as a fiduciary, indicates that this role is significant.248 The
interest group theory offers a compelling explanation for the court’s new
scrutiny not materializing in many of its decisions, but it does not free the
court of its fiduciary role as established by Rule 23(e). When the
chancellors choose to give in to interest group influences or approve
settlements in which shareholders give away significantly more than they
receive, the court’s application of its fiduciary duty becomes unclear and
potentially denies absent shareholders the safeguard that Rule 23
establishes.
It is no longer feasible to continue down this incongruent path. As
explained by the court in Assad, considering the statistic that plaintiffs’
lawyers file claims in 94.9 percent of shareholder litigations,249 it seems
impossible that there are meaningful disclosure violations in every case
being filed in the Delaware courts.250 To say that this is the case is
equivalent to saying that “every financial advisor in America is committing
malpractice—or the lawyers [are]—when they [distribute the proxy
statement].”251 The court risks leaving its fiduciary duty behind if it
continues to approve settlements at such a frequent rate with the same lax
review process.252 It is time to back up the chancellors’ promises of change
with actions by all members of the court.
Allowing class representatives to sign away absent shareholders’ rights—
in some cases with releases that are so broad that they cover unknown
federal securities and antitrust claims—in exchange for disclosures that are
commonly based on publically available information or other information
that is only of minimal value, does not protect shareholders. Instead, it
protects the attorneys on both sides who are getting large paychecks from
the approval of the settlement. It is unlikely that this is the intention of the
court, and therefore it is necessary for the court to adopt a new standard that
prevents this benefit shift and ensures that the court’s fiduciary duty is
clearly and consistently applied.
This can be done by establishing firm standards that are consistently
applied by all members of the court that speak to the questions asked by
Chancellor Bouchard in the Trulia hearing.253 The court must apply a firm
standard of materiality to assess the value of supplemental disclosures and a
firm definition of what is acceptable and not acceptable for release
248. Hamermesh, supra note 11, at 1777.
249. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
250. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Assad, supra note 7, at 38 (“Every deal
basically is the subject of litigation. Litigants are . . . conveniently reaching disclosure
settlements on a repeated pattern . . . . It just can’t be that there are meaningful disclosure
violations in every single M&A case that’s being filed in this court.”).
251. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Trulia, supra note 64, at 21.
252. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, TW Telecom, supra note 95, at 44 (describing
the past laxity of the court and how settlements need to be scrutinized more in the future).
253. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Trulia, supra note 64, at 43–44.
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breadth.254 In utilizing these two standards, the court should focus on
assessing what is required to fulfill its fiduciary duty to the absent
shareholders.
B. A New Materiality Standard Based on a
Holistic Review of the Case’s Merit at Filing
While Chancellor Bouchard has put the wheels into motion for a firmer
materiality standard, the new “plainly material” standard still allows great
flexibility for the other members of the court to interpret and apply the
standard as they see fit.255 This creates a risk that the new standard will
gradually become softer over time. The materiality standard that Vice
Chancellor Laster applied in Aruba is a viable alternative or additional
standard that is aligned with past precedent of the court.256 He determined
that a case must be meritorious when filed in order to be successful at
settlement.257 Vice Chancellor Laster said that this standard requires
complaints to assert claims beyond unfair price, including something that
suggests “a lack of reasonableness.”258 This fits within Chrysler’s rule,
where a claim must be able to withstand a motion to dismiss on the
pleadings, and the plaintiff must make the claim based on provable facts
that hold a reasonable likelihood of success.259 Despite this rule being
active precedent, it is not commonly applied when reviewing the materiality
of settlement consideration.260 By applying this standard, the court will
save valuable resources, instead of going through individual disclosures for
materiality in settlements that have no cognizable value to shareholders.
Jill E. Fisch et al.’s study suggests that settlement disclosures do not impact
the shareholder’s vote to approve or reject a settlement, and therefore it is
ineffective to review each individual disclosure in terms of how it would
alter the total mix of information that a shareholder considers in their
decision to vote.261 A more holistic review of the background of the claims
will ensure that complaints are filed in good faith and representative
attorneys are seeking to benefit the class, without getting bogged down in
details that have proven to provide no cognizable value.
C. Limiting the Scope of the Release to the Scope of the Relief
The second issue described by Chancellor Bouchard provides the true
key to ensuring that the court’s fiduciary duty to the class is fulfilled. The
“intergalactic” releases that are included in a majority of settlement
proposals are the main source of tension between the court’s role and the
254. Id.
255. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
256. Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Aruba Networks, supra note 61, at 59.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 A.2d 384, 387 (Del. 1966); see supra notes 57–61 and
accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text.
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result of recent Delaware settlement approvals.262 This issue can be solved
if all of the members of the court stringently apply the limited release
standard defined by Chancellor Bouchard in Trulia. If the court only
approves settlements that tailor the release to the claims that are asserted in
the complaint and to the terms of the relief, the risk that absent shareholders
are missing out on potentially viable and fruitful claims based on the release
will be minimized.263 In cases where only disclosure is provided to the
shareholder class and there is no indication that the plaintiffs’ attorneys
were actively looking to find other meritorious claims, the court should
require that any bargained-for release be tailored only to the disclosures that
were provided as consideration.264 Despite Vice Chancellor Noble’s theory
that in many cases the potential claims being signed away may not truly
exist, the reality of the circumstance is that only minimal discovery is
completed before arriving at a disclosure-only settlement, and therefore
representative shareholders are signing away absent shareholder rights with
almost no confirmation that there are not viable claims.265 In both Assad
and Trulia, Chancellor Bouchard provided examples of how this risk could
become a reality.266 His depiction of Matsushita provided the most pointed
example of why Vice Chancellor Noble’s theory is shortsighted. A
Delaware settlement eliminated a valid federal claim based on a poorly
conceived complaint, despite active litigation taking place in federal court
in California at the same time.267 This settlement extinguished all federal
and unknown claims and thereby resulted in the dismissal of a federal
case.268 This is exactly the risk that Vice Chancellor Noble disregarded in
Carefusion and shows that if absolute certainty is not possible, a higher
degree of certainty should at least be required.269 It is not justifiable to sign
262. See supra notes 100–02, 108–15, 126–28, 133, 139, 149–53, 169–70, 175 and
accompanying text.
263. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. While it is possible that allowing a
release for claims in the complaint would create an issue where complaints are instead filed
with a wider array of unmeritorious claims in hope that they will be bargaining tools for the
release, the new materiality standard would minimize this concern. Under the Chrysler rule,
these claims would not be sustainable, and therefore a settlement would not be approved. See
supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.
264. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
266. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing, Assad, supra note 7, at 33–34 (providing a
hypothetical fraud case that could exist after the settlement is approved because it would be
blocked by the release); supra note 128 and accompanying text; see also Transcript of
Settlement Hearing, Trulia, supra note 64, at 41–42 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996), as an example of a case where a settlement was approved with
a broad release that later barred a valid discriminatory tender offer claim that was unknown
to the court when the settlement was approved); see also In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig.,
No. 10020-CB, 2016 WL 325008, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016) (discussing a case where
the Court of Chancery almost approved a settlement calling it “a very close call” that would
have released claims that ended up earning stockholders over $100 million after new counsel
took over the case (citing Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 134, In re Rural/Metro Corp.,
Stockholders Litig., No. 6350-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 17, 2012))).
267. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 516 U.S. at 370–71.
268. Id. at 370–72.
269. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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away the shareholders’ rights to future unknown claims without the
shareholders receiving a similarly significant consideration, a type of
security that a disclosure-only settlement cannot provide.
If the complaint asserts a specific, stronger claim that is disproven by
facts presented in the record, then the court may consider approving a
release that also covers those claims, because this also can help prevent
additional frivolous litigation. In order to fulfill the court’s duty to
shareholders, however, no members of the court should continue approving
“intergalactic” releases that go beyond the scope of the case itself, into the
realm of unknown and federal securities claims, without there being
extenuating circumstances.
In a disclosure-only settlement, the
supplemental disclosures are highly unlikely to be of enough value to
justify such broad consideration and are not worth the risk that shareholders
cannot sue in a situation that may result in actual financial relief.
By following the above recommendations for establishing a new standard
for settlement review, the Court of Chancery should be able to continue
protecting defendants from unnecessary litigation, but through deterrence
mechanisms that will be built into the review process instead of approval of
uneven settlements. Additionally, this will prevent the court from risking
the safeguards for which Rule 23(e) was created from being sacrificed by
protecting shareholders that may otherwise have their rights bargained away
without fair compensation.
CONCLUSION
While there are clearly structural and external factors that have created
the inconsistencies that currently exist within the Delaware Court of
Chancery regarding the way that the settlement approval process is
undertaken, this does not diminish the importance of the court’s fiduciary
role in this review process. The apprehension of the rest of the court to
change their standard of review as quickly as Vice Chancellor Laster did is
understandable in light of the interest group theory. Despite this, the court
has given warnings to attorneys in Assad, TW Telecom, Riverbed, and
Susser. This is more than a sufficient amount of warning to provide the
Delaware bar before applying a new, stricter standard of review. These
parties have had more than enough time to understand and prepare for what
is to come. With this task complete and the significance of the court’s role
as the “gatekeeper” explained, the time for apprehension clearly has passed.
In light of recent studies that have shown the proliferation of M&A
litigation and the minimal value that the resulting settlements provide to
shareholders, the low level of scrutiny that has dominated the court can no
longer be justified. By consistently utilizing the new materiality standard
and a new standard for release breadth that is proposed in Part IV, the court
will enable a more consistent application of its fiduciary duty that utilizes
the significance that it deserves. In order to comply with Rule 23(e) and the
fiduciary role that it creates, the Delaware Court of Chancery must now
move past this period of laxity and join Vice Chancellor Laster in defining a
new future for M&A litigation and class action settlements.

